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Abstract
This paper documents the evolution of a range of political preferences among first-generation immigrants
in Western Europe. The overall aim is to study to what extent and at what pace immigrants adapt to the
political norms that prevail in their host countries. I use a cross-national research strategy to compare and
analyze attitudes of foreign-born individuals in 16 European countries and find strong empirical support for
assimilation over time: On average, the opinion gap between natives and immigrants’ political preferences
on redistribution, gay rights, EU unification, immigration policies, and trust level in national governments
is reduced by 40% after 20 years of residence in the destination country. I also provide evidence that most
of this assimilation is driven by immigrants from non-developed countries, and that convergence in political
preferences varies significantly across immigrants’ economic and cultural background as well as with the size
of the immigrant group from their country of origin. Finally, I show that a substantial part of assimilation on
gay rights, immigration and political trust is driven by acculturation at the national level where immigrants
with longer tenure tend to adapt more to the political preferences of natives in their destination country.
These findings shed new light on the timing and magnitude of the political assimilation of first-generation
immigrants, with potentially important implications for the political economy of immigration policy.
1I thank Francois Poinas and Philippe de Donder for excellent advice and feedback as well as the participants of the IEB seminar
at the Toulouse of Economics BLABLA
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1 Introduction
Modern European countries are witnessing an especially vivid political and social debate about immigrants’
assimilation and integration into receiving societies. As policymakers of traditionally ”immigrant” countries are
struggling to integrate already sizable foreign-born populations into the economic, political, and social fabric
of the state, the recent refugee crisis has increased concerns among public opinion and the political pressures
associated with immigration flows. The COVID-19 pandemic notwithstanding, dealing with the ethnic and
cultural heterogeneity associated with immigration is therefore one of the most important challenges that Eu-
ropean governments are facing, not least because immigrants’ political preferences can significantly alter the
design and the political economy of public policies in their host society. To gain a complete understanding of
the policy impact of foreign-born populations, and in particular whether or not immigrant voters represent a
distinctly different political bloc from their native counterparts, scholars need to address a number of issues.
What are the patterns of political assimilation? How do they differ across immigrants of different social, reli-
gious, and ethnic backgrounds? How do they differ across host societies and integration policies? What are the
implications and consequences for economic and electoral outcomes and public policy? How can institutions
help accommodate the political integration of immigrants? The purpose of this paper is to provide a modest
but original contribution to this debate by studying the dynamics of the opinion gap between immigrants and
natives’ political preferences.
Previous literature has stressed the important role of cultural transmission in shaping individual preferences.
Immigrants often take cultural values with them from their countries of origin, and these cultural and pref-
erential traits translate into specific behaviors that have a wide-ranging, substantial and persistent impact
on immigrants’ integration. Transmitted culture is a long-lived component of preferences for redistribution
(Luttmer and Singhal, 2011; Hammar, 2020), family and social values such as fertility and female labour force
participation (Fernandez and Fogli, 2006), living arrangements (Giuliano, 2007), economic behaviour (Guiso et
al., 2006; Tabellini et al., 2010; Henrich, 2000), political and civic participation (Alesina and Giuliano, 2011;
Aleksynska, 2011), trust (Algan and Cahuc, 2010), electoral choices (Just et al., 2010), tax morale (Kountouris,
2013), or environmental preferences (Litina et al. 2016). Another strand of the large scholarship on immigrants’
integration documents the symmetric influence of receiving societies on the attitudes of immigrants and their
children at destination. Although assimilation patterns remain highly heterogeneous across destination and ori-
gin countries, one of the general findings in this field is that immigrants’ attitudes tend to converge with those
of native born individuals. In America, immigrants have been found to assimilate with respect to earnings and
labour markets (Borjas, 1995; Uhlendorff and Zimmermann, 2006; Hu, 2000), occupational mobility (Chiswick
et al., 2005; Green, 1999), participation in welfare programs (Borjas, 2002; Riphahn, 2014), fertility choices
(Blau, 1992; Fernandez and Fogli, 2009), or cultural assimilation at large (Abramitzky et al., 2016; Giavazzi
et al. 2019). In Europe, several contributions highlight the convergence to the norm of foreign-born residents
in matters of interpersonal trust (Dinesen et al., 2010), social and economic outcomes (Algan et al., 2012),
civic participation (Aleksynska, 2011), gender roles (Breidahl et al., 2016) and social relations (De Palo et al.,
2007). At the same time, immigrants’ political views on welfare assistance (Dancygier et al., 2006; Reeskens et
al., 2015; Schmidt-Catran et al., 2017), political satisfaction and trust in institutions (Maxwell, 2010) are also
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subject to the influence of European host societies.
In my reading, the previous works provide an essential yet incomplete picture of immigrants’ assimilation.
While all recognize that the amount of time that immigrants spend in their host country is one of the major
factors of integration, with few exceptions, mostly in the US context, these studies focus on intergenerational
differences between immigrants and natives and adopt a static framework which fails to address the dynamics
of assimilation patterns. Instead, I propose in this paper to track the evolution of first-generation immigrants’
preferences over time and provide a chronological account that is more appropriate to study assimilation and
ultimately explore the consequences of immigrants’ political participation on policy and electoral outcomes1.
Moreover, focusing on intergenerational differences is not necessarily the most intuitive way of thinking about
integration. For instance, first-generation immigrants who emigrated to their country of residence at an early
age have hardly been exposed to the culture and institutions of their country of origin prior to relocating.
In fact, for many of them, the only channel of cultural transmission from their origin country is likely to be
parental influence. These ”early” migrants also benefit from increased contact with their host society through
schooling and education, which is likely to play a critical part in their socialization process. In this regard, one
could expect their integration to be closer to that of second-generation immigrant than a fellow first-generation
immigrant who came to live in that same country at the age of 50.
My study therefore treats political assimilation as a dynamic phenomenon. I examine the distance and conver-
gence in political preferences between natives and foreign-born immigrants in Western Europe on the following
political issues: Redistribution, gay rights, EU unification, immigration policy, and political trust.
I first investigate whether or not immigrants have the same distribution of preferences as comparably situated
natives, and whether this distribution varies with the time spent in the host country. I document how the
political preferences of first-generation immigrants from over 180 origin countries differ from those of natives
in 16 European countries. On average, I find that immigrants are slightly more conservative than natives in
terms of welfare preferences. They also hold more restrictive views on gay rights, show greater levels of trust in
national parliaments and are more supportive of EU unification and open immigration policies. For all political
issues but redistribution, the dynamic analysis reveals a gradual disappearance of migrants’ original preference
patterns, suggesting assimilation through a natural process where they gain access to the same socio-economic
opportunities and cultural traits as natives of the host country. Spending 20 years in the destination country -
the average tenure of first-generation immigrants in the study - therefore reduces the opinion gap by as much
as 40% in matters of immigration, political trust, gay rights and attitudes towards the European Union. In
contrast, immigrants’ support for redistribution coincide with those of natives after only 5 to 10 years in the
destination country.
Next, I build on the segmented assimilation theory (Gordon, 1964; Portes and Zhou, 1994) and look for vari-
ations in assimilation patterns across immigrants’ background and community size. My intuition is two-fold.
First, migrants’ origin country and community size at destination may create or remove specific barriers to
integration which are associated with lagged or incomplete political assimilation. Second, the economic ap-
proach to cultural integration emphasizes the importance of individual incentives and of the opportunity costs
1On this subject, see Aleksynska (2011), whose results show that immigrants’ political involvement in the political life of their
receiving societies increases with the duration of stay and therefore calls for a dynamic approach to the study of immigrants’
political integration.
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associated with different integration patterns (see Lazear, 1999; Bisin and Verdier, 2000, 2001, 2010; Konya,
2005). Immigrants may therefore form endogenous preferences about assimilation based on whether assimila-
tion increases their chances in the host country, which are themselves determined by immigrants’ cultural or
economic background as well as the size of their social networks. My results show that these characteristics play
an important part in shaping both the size of the preference gap and the speed of assimilation. Assimilation
is almost exclusively driven by immigrants from non-developed countries, while Western migrants have closer
preferences to natives upon arrival and show no sign of convergence whatsoever. Moreover, cultural legacy and
religious beliefs strongly influence assimilation: Muslim immigrants hold political opinions that are consistently
further from those of natives than other immigrants, and their views on gay rights remain much more conser-
vative over time. I also find that immigrants that are better equipped to integrate economically and socially
- either through language proficiency or access to larger social networks - and for whom the relative value of
cultural and political assimilation is relatively lower are much less likely to assimilate than other immigrants.
In the last part of the paper, I examine immigrants’ gradual adoption of country-specific cultural norms and
conventions. I find that the average political preference in an immigrant’s destination country has a large and
significant effect on her own preference. Moreover, this effect is greater among immigrants with longer tenure
for political preferences on gay rights, immigration, and trust in national parliaments, suggesting acculturation
to country-specific norms.
In light of these findings, it is worth noting that the ESS has not been designed to include or oversample
immigrants, which might increase the potential for bias in the general analysis. However, previous studies have
shown that the ESS sampling method is reliable when it comes to reflect the actual structure of the population
between foreign-born and native residents and the actual origin countries of the foreign-born immigrants (Cas-
tles and Miller, 2003; De Rooij, 2012). Also, I do not have, for example, panel data on immigrants before and
after migration, nor do I have data on their socioeconomic characteristics while still in their sending countries.
Therefore, I cannot fully control for cohort effects and the categorization of immigrants by duration of stay
is not free from composition concerns. In particular, if cross-country migration decisions are correlated with
political preferences, my results could suffer from a self-selection bias. This issue will be further discussed in
the robustness section of the paper.
This paper is directly related to the empirical research that analyzes the political preferences of immigrants in
their host environment. Within this literature, the issue of preferences for redistribution has probably received
the most attention. Dancygier et al. (2006) show that immigrants are no more likely to support increased social
spending or redistributive measures than natives and find support for hypotheses highlighting selection effects
and the impact of the immigration regime. Reeskens et al. (2015) analyse the 2008 ”Welfare Attitudes” module
of the European Social Survey and find that differences in welfare opinions are primarily explained by the more
disadvantaged position of immigrants in society. Moreover, their results suggest that immigrants’ views on
welfare closely follow those of the non-migrant population of the country they are living in, suggesting strong
social integration at the opinion level. Using German longitudinal survey, the findings of Schmidt-Catran et al.
(2017) are also consistent with the claim that immigrants’ welfare preferences are subject to a socializing effect
of the host countries. Turning to political trust, Maxwell (2010) finds that first-generation immigrants have
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more positive attitudes to national governments in Europe while native-origin and second-generation migrant-
origin individuals have similar political trust and satisfaction scores. He interprets these outcomes as a sign that
political expectations about the government are highly determined by integration factors related to the stages
of migration, and in particular the influence of first-generation migrants’ experience of undemocratic regimes
in their home country. Using the same data, Algan et al. (2012) documents that the gap in political trust
level between first-generation immigrants and natives is exclusively driven by foreign-born individuals with less
than 20 years of residence, while second-generation immigrants hold actually more negative opinions of national
parliaments. The present study is also related to Roeder’s contribution (2018) on immigrants’ attitudes toward
homosexuality, in which she finds that immigrants in Europe hold overall more negative attitudes than natives,
and provides evidence of both intra and inter-generational acculturation of these attitudes with declining im-
portance of origin country context. Finally, a recent paper by Giavazzi et al. (2019) contains a comprehensive
analysis of the values and beliefs of different generations of US immigrants. They find that attitudes towards
politics and redistribution, sexuality, abortion, religious values show a lower degree of convergence to the pre-
vailing norm than attitudes towards cooperation such as trustworthiness, helpfulness and fairness. Because my
paper attempts to characterize the political force that immigrants potentially represent, it also speaks to the
literature on immigrants’ voting behaviour and electoral participation. Within this literature, my approach
builds on Aleksynska (2011), which documents that immigrants actively participate in the life of the receiving
societies, increasingly so with the duration of stay, but that the speed of assimilation is different for immigrant
groups with different background and origin countries.
My contribution to the study of immigrants’ political preferences is innovative in several respects. First, while
most existing contributions study the persistence of cultural traits or the convergence in preferences from one
generation of immigrants to the next, I focus on a dynamic analysis of first-generation immigrants. I am
therefore able to provide a more detailed picture of the speed of political assimilation and quantify the size
of the preference gap between immigrants and natives at the time of migration and its evolution over time.
Also, I study the differences between natives and immigrants in preferences over national immigration policies
and EU sentiment, which, to the best of my knowledge, have not yet been studied in the literature, at least
in the European context. Third, I present the first large-scale, cross-country study on the intra-generational
acculturation of immigrants’ political preferences using European data.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data used in the analysis. Section 3
outlines the estimation strategy and examines results. The last section concludes.
2 Data description
I use 5 rounds of the European Social Survey (2010, 2012, 2014, 2016, 2018) and focus on Western European,
OECD member states. I also restrict the sample to respondents who were older than 16 and younger than
100 years old at the time of the interview and distinguish between natives and first-generation immigrants.
I identify natives as respondents born in their country of residence with parents also born in their country
of residence to avoid the potentially confounding effects of second-generation immigrants, who are excluded
from the model. First-generation immigrants are drawn among individuals born outside of their country of
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residence, and for whom at least one parent was not born in their country of residence. I decide to leave
out immigrants born in a foreign country but with both parents born in their current country of residence as
members of this group are very likely to be influenced by their parents’ cultural origins and therefore not suited
for the exploration of the assimilation hypothesis. To capture immigrants’ duration of stay in their destination
country, I use information provided by the survey from the 2010 round onwards: All foreign-born respondents
in the sample are asked about the year they first came to live in their host country. I use the difference between
the year respondents were surveyed and the year they claimed to have arrived in the country as a measure of
the years of residence spent at destination2. Foreign-born whose country of origin and year of arrival in the
destination country are not specified are excluded from the analysis. This leads to an overall sample size of
127,000 observations, of which 12,000 first-generation immigrants and 115,000 natives in 16 countries: Austria,
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Table 1 and 2 of the Appendix contain the description of this
sample.
Individual political and policy preferences on five different issues are measured through an ordinal scale. The
first one is redistribution. I use respondents’ opinion to the following statement: ”The government should take
measures to reduce differences in income levels”, to which respondents are asked if they strongly agree, agree,
neither agree nor disagree, disagree, or disagree strongly. I recode this question on an ascending 4-point scale in
the following way: 0 from strongly disagree to 4 for strongly agree3. Using an identical scale, the second variable
captures political attitudes to homosexuality through respondents’ opinion about the following statement ”Gay
men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish”. I use the same rescaling method as for
redistribution to construct the associated dependent variable. Third, I investigate attitudes towards European
Union through respondents’ position about greater unification of the EU from 0 - ”Unification already gone too
far” to 10 - ”Unification must go further”. Fourth, I look at migrants’ attitudes to immigration policy through
respondents’ opinion about the following statement on a 0-3 scale: ”To what extent do you think [country]
should allow people of the same race or ethnic group as most [country] people to come and live here”4. Last, I
study trust in political institutions using respondents’ level of trust in their residence country’s parliament, on
a scale from 0 - ”No trust at all” to 10 - ”Complete trust”.
Table 3 and 4 summarizes the distribution of political preferences for foreign-born and native individuals.
Although differences between them are modest in absolute terms, these descriptive statistics suggest that
immigrants are slightly more opposed to redistribution and gay rights than Western European natives. They
also show markedly higher levels of trust in national parliaments and support for EU unification, and are
in favour of more open immigration policies. Moreover, among immigrants, those with longer duration at
destination have views that are significantly closer to natives as opposed to immigrants with shorter duration,
which suggests assimilation with natives at the political level. Also, the size of the opinion gap between natives
2The distribution of immigrants’ tenure at destination is presented in Figure 1.
3While the 2008 and 2016 ESS rounds have specific modules on welfare preferences, I choose to use the only question capturing
policy preferences for redistribution that is present in all rounds of the survey to maximize the number of first-generation immigrants
in the sample.
4The ESS asks in every round several other questions about individuals’ perception of the level of immigration, with mentions to
migrants’ relative economic position and place of origin. In practice, individual answers to these questions are strongly correlated,
and I therefore choose the most neutral of these statements as the reference variable.
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and migrants with greater duration of stay varies across political items, indicating that the speed and pattern
of convergence may be heterogeneous across political opinions.
3 Empirical analysis
First, I report a descriptive analysis of the patterns of convergence in political attitudes between natives and
first-generation immigrants in Western Europe. This provides an initial indication of the extent to which
immigrants adapt to the political preferences of natives and the speed at which convergence in attitudes takes
place. Second, I investigate whether migrants’ background and community size matter for political integration.
Third, I ran a multivariate analysis limited to immigrants, in which I examine the effect of natives’ average
preferences on each political issue on immigrants’ own political views in the same country.
3.1 The opinion gap in political attitudes between migrants and na-
tives
The point of departure my the analysis of differences in political preferences between immigrants and native-
born. I therefore adopt the following specification over the full sample of natives and immigrants:
Prefijt = α+ β0Firstgeni + β1Resyearsi + γXi + µj + µt + εijt (1)
where the dependent variable Pref is the preference of individual i surveyed in country j and ESS round t on
a specific political issue. My main independent variables are the dummy variable Firstgen, which takes value
1 if the respondent is foreign-born, and 0 otherwise, and the continuous variable Res years, which captures the
duration of stay of a migrant in his or her host country5. In all regressions, I control in vector X for several
individual socio-economic characteristics such as gender, age, whether or not the respondent is married, years
of education, the respondent’s assessment of his or her financial situation, the size of the household, individual
employment status, whether or not the respondent is a member of an ethnic minority, and religiosity, education
level and work status of the respondent’s partner, household’s income level (based on the income distribution in
the residence country) and primary source of income, as well as past unemployment experience. I also include
a full set of dummy variables for the country of residence and ESS survey round.
Table 6 presents the results of this baseline regression. They confirm the intuition from the descriptive statistics
in Table 4. On average, there is a significant opinion gap between first-generation migrants and natives across
all five political variables. After controlling for socio-economic individual characteristics, first-generation mi-
grants are slightly more opposed to redistribution, have more conservative views towards gay rights, are more
supportive of EU unification and open immigration policies, and possess higher levels of trust in their host
country’s parliament than natives. These differences vary however in magnitudes. The average gap in prefer-
ences for redistribution (column 2) is very small and corresponds to 0.05 standard deviation. Ceteris paribus,
5This variable is coded 0 for natives. It therefore applies only to immigrants and is thus effectively an interaction term.
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the marginal effect of being born in a foreign country on attitudes to redistribution is therefore equivalent to
moving up from the 5th to the 6th decile of the income distribution6. This coefficient is however significant at
the 1% level, indicating that upon arrival, migrants coming to live in Western Europe hold generally slightly
more conservative views towards redistribution. Contrary to the welfare magnet hypothesis which posits that
immigrants are benefit tourists who migrate to take advantage of generous welfare services in the destination
country, I therefore observe no support for such a claim, in line with the previous literature (Dancygier, 2006;
Algan et al., 2012). Instead, because immigrants represent a self-selected group of people that are willing to
uproot themselves to migrate and are often characterized as risk-averse, they may be more likely to believe in
effort and individualism and show greater reluctance to state provided financial assistance.
On the other hand, migration status is one, if not the strongest individual predictor of other political attitudes.
The opinion gap between natives and immigrants on homosexuality, EU, immigration, and political trust all
ranges between 0.2 and 0.3 standard deviation. On gay rights, immigrants have much more restrictive views
than natives, which is not surprising if one considers that most of the migrants in the sample come from non-
developed, more socially conservative countries. This effect is equivalent to 1.6 times the effect of gender on
attitudes to gay rights, and correspond to an average 0.365 gap on a 0 − 10 scale while men score on average
0.22 lower than women on that same issue. Turning to attitudes to EU unification, the marginal effect of being
born in a foreign country is almost twice as large as that of living in an urban area7 and is matched in size
only by respondents’ perception of their household’s income. To the extent that political attitudes towards EU
unification reflects political beliefs about internationalism, it comes as no surprise that first-generation migrants
who travelled across borders to come and live in Europe are more enthusiastic about European integration.
Likewise, because first-generation immigrants experienced the hardship of leaving their home country to go and
settle abroad, they are also significantly more in favour of allowing more immigrants to come and live in their
destination country. The positive effect of being foreign-born in column 11 is equivalent to having completed 4
additional years of education. Finally, immigrants score 0.6 point higher than natives when asked about their
level of trust in national parliaments. Ceteris paribus, this opinion gap corresponds to the difference that exists
between individuals at the bottom and at the top of the income distribution. A possible explanation for this
substantial gap is that many migrants leave their home country because they are in some way unsatisfied with
the existing political regimes. Poor economic outcomes, conflict, political repression or other forms of discrim-
ination are among the several motives for which immigrants may hold particularly negative view about the
government of their origin country. At the same time, existing research has documented that first-generation
migrants are more optimistic and positive about the government of the country where they have self-consciously
chosen to emigrate in hopes of improving their lives (Roder et al, 2012; Maxwell, 2010), and therefore place
greater faith in their destination country’s political institutions.
As a second step, I turn to assimilation by studying the effect of time spent in the destination country. Control-
ling for immigrants’ duration of stay in the host country gives more information on the timing and structure of
the preference gaps. When this regressor is included in the analysis, the coefficient associated with being a first-
generation immigrants captures the difference in preferences between natives and freshly arrived immigrants.
6The coefficient - not reported here - associated with individual household income decile rank in model (2) is -0.043.
7The corresponding coefficient in column 8 is 0.381, while individuals living in rural areas score 0.2 unit lower than urban
dwellers in the same model.
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My results show that the years of residence have a significant and negative effect on the gap between natives
and first-generation migrants for all political preferences. While these changes in opinions remain modest in
absolute terms - in the order of a tenth of a standard deviation -, the effect is quite sizable in relative terms:
Spending 20 years - the average residence time of migrants in our sample - reduces the initial preference gap
by as much as 40% in matters of redistribution, gay rights and immigration policy and up to 50% for political
trust and attitudes to EU unification. For a better grasp of these mechanisms, I analyze the effect of residence
time by breaking the first-generation immigrant sample into cohorts and report graphically the results of the
following estimation:
Prefijt = β0 + βk
∑
k
Cohortki + γXi + µj + µt + εijt (2)
where X contains the same individual control variables as model (1)8. I break down the immigrants sample
into 7 time cohorts, and let Cohortk be the dummy variable that takes value 1 if an individual belongs to
cohort k, and 0 otherwise9.
The blue lines in the graphs of Figure 2 show a strong convergence of political attitudes over time between na-
tives and all first-generation immigrants. With the exception of redistributive preferences, where a statistically
significant opinion gap remains between natives and immigrants with more than 45 years spent at destination,
it is very modest in size and orders of magnitude smaller than the existing gap between immigrants upon arrival
and natives. Another interesting feature of these results is the pace at which convergence in attitudes takes
place.
My findings show a very flexible adjustment of redistributive preferences, where immigrants’ support for re-
distribution coincides with those of natives after only 5 to 10 years in the destination country. As discussed
previously, immigrants’ welfare preferences are relatively close to natives’ upon arrival, and a possible explana-
tion for this swift convergence is that immigrants’ access to welfare services improve significantly after a few
years of residence in their destination country when they obtain legal permanent residency and are therefore
entitled to the same benefits as natives10. This interpretation is also in line with the findings of Renema et al.
(2019) that immigrants are indeed more supportive of spending on welfare to which they perceived they have
greater access, and consistent with the contributory nature of many welfare schemes such as unemployment
benefits or social security which require individuals to have participated for some years before they can benefit
from them.
In contrast, it takes 20 years before any statistically significant change in migrants’ relative attitudes towards
gay rights shows up. Political opinions about gay rights have arguably fewer self-interested motives and greater
religious and cultural roots than other the political outcomes studied in this paper, which could explain why
immigrants’ policy preferences takes a long time to change. 11
8While being important in predicting political preferences, household income level is missing for almost one fifth of the sample,
for both immigrants and native-born. In regressions similar to model (1) without the income variable, coefficients retain their
significance, and most of them change only marginally in magnitude. I therefore omit income decile rank in model (2) and all
further estimations.
9The number of observations for each cohort is available in Table 2
10According to many, permanent residency outweighs citizenship as the relevant eligibility criterion for accessing welfare benefits
in Europe (see for instance Guiraudon, 2002; or Koopmans, 2010).
11This of course assumes away the sexual orientation of respondents, which is not reported in the survey. However, given that
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Surprisingly, I find that foreign-born attitudes towards immigration become more negative overtime and con-
verge to those of natives. Rather than showing solidarity with future potential migrants, they appear to be
subject to a club effect as their support for immigration starts to decrease sharply after 10 years in the desti-
nation country once their position has become less vulnerable12.
Finally, the bottom graphs in Figure 2 reveal that the opinion gap in trust in national parliaments and atti-
tudes to EU unification is also reduced significantly over time. Whether it is driven by cultural changes or the
slow updating of the quality of government and the role played by the European Union is still unclear at this
stage. However, political assimilation of attitudes to domestic and international institutions exhibit different
trajectories: While no significant difference remain between immigrants and natives after 20 years in terms
of support of EU unification, it takes over 45 years before foreign-born individuals’ level of trust in national
parliaments is the same as natives’.
Before moving further into the analysis, I run the previous regressions excluding immigrants who came to live
in their country of residence under the age of 15.13 The reason is two fold. First, as already mentioned in the
introduction, immigrants who came to live at an early age in their country of residence are not only much less
exposed to the culture and institutions of their country of origin prior to relocating, but also have increased
contact with native society through schooling and education, which is likely to play a critical part in their
assimilation14. Second, because the ESS surveys individuals aged 15 and older, the distribution of the number
of years spent in the country of residence is heavily skewed to the left among these migrants compared to those
who came to live at an adult age. This could lead to a compositional bias if those migrants arrived at an early
age are only represented in older cohorts (i.e among immigrants that have spent more time in the host country).
If these migrants have views that are closer to natives, this would in turn artificially increases convergence in
attitudes. The red line in each graph of Figure 2 shows that this convergence bias exists but remains very
modest in size. The general trend observed for the full sample of immigrants holds when I reduce the sample
to those who came to live in their country of residence at an adult age. Convergence in political attitudes is
only slightly weaker among these late migrants on matters of homosexuality and EU unification, indicating
that some of the migrants that are the most assimilated have been excluded from the analysis. Besides, there is
no significant difference in political orientations whether early migrants are excluded from the sample or not in
terms of political trust. The pattern for redistribution preferences for the full sample and the late sample are
also remarkably similar, and age at arrival matters little in the pace and extent to which migrants’ preferences
over immigration policy converge with natives’ views.
sexual orientation is relatively stable, I shall not be concerned with the possibility that migrants’ sexual orientation change over
time to coincide with that of natives. This pattern could also be due partly to the fact that the ESS question about gay rights
is the only dependent variable that does not explicitly refer to the current situation in the host country, leading respondents to
express views that are less directly influenced by national contexts
12Although immigrants can face deportation, those who have lived more than 5 to 10 years are in general well settled in their
host country and unlikely to face such deportation threats
13These migrants represent around 25% of the entire first-generation migrant sample.
14In fact, for an overwhelming majority among them, the only channel of transmission of culture from their origin country is
parental influence.
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3.2 Differences in assimilation patterns across immigrant groups
The main objective of this section is to provide a more complete picture of assimilation by looking at patterns
of convergence across migrants with different backgrounds. To do that, I build on the segmented assimilation
literature and look for systematic variation across different sub-groups of immigrants. Because political and
economic factors at the origin can affect significantly the way immigrants assimilate (Borjas, 1987), I first split
the immigrant sample into sub-samples of developed and non-developed countries of origin15. This division
potentially reflects the costs of integration, considering that Western migrants have an economic, political,
social and cultural background that is closer to Western European natives16. Another significant barrier to
integration is racial and ethnic discrimination. Contemporary non-white migrants in Europe may face intense
discrimination even after living in the host country for a very long time. This discrimination creates numerous
social, economic, and political problems for integration. Because the ESS does not ask about respondent’s
ethnicity, I use religion and more specifically Islam - the most stigmatized religion in Europe -. Building on
previous evidence highlighting potentially different assimilation patterns for Muslim immigrants (Constant et
al., 2006; Bisin et al., 2008), I split the sample between immigrants with Muslim religious denomination and
immigrants with none or all other religious belonging. I also look at whether the convergence in political at-
titudes is stronger for first-generation migrants whose country of origin shared a common language with their
destination country. Because linguistic and colonial ties can be regarded as a vector of cultural transmission,
I expect immigrants who possess those traits to hold political opinions that are closer to those of Western
European17. Finally, I investigate the effect of the size of immigrant communities on the political assimilation
of their members. On the one hand, immigrants’ local context and contact with co-ethnics may shape their
political preferences through network effects that help them adjust to their new environment. For instance,
economists have found that information about the welfare state and its benefits can be spread through net-
works and social chains. In particular, increased neighborhood contact with co-ethnics with above-average
welfare participation rates may raise individual welfare use (Bertrand, Luttmer, and Mullainathan, 2000; Bor-
jas and Hilton, 1996), which may in turn increase support for government redistribution. In this regard, bigger
immigrant community can facilitate assimilation. In contrast, another strand of the economics literature on
cultural transmission argues that a bigger community size decreases immigrants’ incentives to integrate. The
underlying trade-off weighs cultural against economic incentives, which posits that there exists a large enough
critical mass of immigrants that if the group maintains its distinct culture then, for any immigrant, the cost
of switching culture outweighs the benefits of increased interaction. To the extent that political preferences
have an important cultural component, one could expect foreign-born that belong to bigger communities to
assimilate less because they have more limited benefits from such assimilation. Following previous studies
on community behavior (see Card et al., 2008; Munshi, 2013; Advani et al., 2015; Giavazzi et al., 2019), I
split the immigrant sample based on community size. For each foreign-born individual, I compute the share
15The list of developed countries includes EU-15, Norway, Switzerland, Canada, the USA, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South
Korea, and Israel. All other countries are treated as non-developed
16A further distinction was made between migrants originating from democratic countries VS those coming from non-democratic
countries at the time of migration. Due to the high correlation between economic development and the level of democracy, the
results were very similar to the analysis conducted on the developed and non-developed samples and are therefore not reported
here.
17Data on language proximity comes from the CEPII (Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales).
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of immigrants from the same origin country living in his or her destination country, and distinguish between
those for whom this community represents less or more than 1% of the destination country’s total population.18
Average opinion gaps are reported in Table 7. Taken together, they suggest that immigrants from more de-
veloped countries, non-Muslim migrants, and migrants who originate from a country that shares a common
language with their destination country have political preferences that are closer to natives on matters of homo-
sexuality, EU, and political trust. Because politics in developed countries is a relatively homogeneous set that
includes democracy and free market institutions since the beginning of the post-WWII era, individuals from
these countries are arguably more familiar with the functioning of parliamentary democracies, therefore show-
ing more similar levels of trust in parliaments to natives than immigrants from non-developed countries. Also,
individuals in developed countries usually have more liberal attitudes to homosexuality, and it is not surprising
that their views are not significantly different from those of native-born Western Europeans. Finally, because
85% of migrants from developed countries in the sample are EU citizens, their attitudes towards EU unification
are obviously closer to those of fellow EU-citizen, Western European native-born. Turning to the opinion gap
across religious sub-groups, most of Muslim immigrants come from countries ruled by undemocratic political
regimes, sometimes where political institutions have collapsed or failed so badly that they represent one of the
main reasons why immigrants chose to emigrate in the first place. As a result, immigrants’ preferences continue
to be influenced by the quality of government and institutions in their origin country even when living in their
host country, which leads to relatively better opinions about Western political institutions, either national -
country parliaments - or international - the European Union -. It is also very intuitive that these migrants hold
significantly more conservative views on gay rights if one considers that Islam strongly prohibits homosexuality.
Moreover, Table 7 indicates that immigrants who come from a country that shares a common language with
their destination country are also more likely to hold preferences that are close to European natives. This
is reflected for instance by the coefficients on preferences about redistribution and gay rights, as well as the
coefficients associated with immigrants’ perception of political institutions, both domestic and European. Fi-
nally, no clear patterns emerge for immigrants that belong to larger communities and networks. The opinion
gaps for redistributive preferences are remarkably similar, and while immigrants with larger communities retain
significantly higher levels of trust in national parliaments, they are in contrast much closer to natives in terms
of support for EU unification, and their views are on average not statistically different from other immigrants
on gay rights and immigration.
I now replicate the dynamic analysis of model 2 on the sub-groups of immigrants.19 Figure 3, 4, 5, and 6
respectively contains the results of this analysis for immigrants subgroups based on economic development,
religion, language, and community size.
First, no significant differences exist between the various sub-groups of migrants under study at the time of ar-
rival on preferences for redistribution. While migrants belonging to smaller communities and those who do not
18I use 2010 national Census data provided by the OECD International Migration Database. I group immigrants from Czech
Republic, Slovakia and former Czechoslovakia into a single group. Moreover, I also exclude from the analysis immigrants whose
country of birth is listed as USSR because the ESS does not report which of the former soviet states these immigrants came from.
19Because the number of observations in each sub-group is smaller than in the full sample used in model 2, the number of cohorts
is reduced from 7 to 5 groups.
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share a common language with their destination country appear less supportive of redistribution upon arrival,
the confidence interval of their respective sub-groups is too large to draw any conclusions about their relative
preferences that would pass the test of statistical significance. No distinctive pattern of assimilation therefore
emerges for any of the subgroups under consideration, and the evidence points towards an assimilation process
where migrants’ cultural and social background plays a relatively small part.
Policy preferences on gay rights paint a very different picture. Upon arrival, immigrants from developed coun-
tries exhibit no significant differences with natives, and this gap remains statistically insignificant over time
(see Figure 3). This suggests that immigrants from non-developed countries are the main group driving the
general convergence on attitudes to gay rights. Across religious sub-groups, a striking pattern emerges from
Fig. 4. Muslim foreign-born are not only significantly more opposed to gay people living their life as they
wish than non-Muslim first-generation migrants, but they also show no sign of assimilation. While the views
of non-Muslim migrants slowly catch up to natives’, those of Muslim immigrants remain about 1 point lower
on a 0-4 scale throughout.
On political trust in national parliaments, immigrants coming from a developed country assimilate faster but
this is mostly the product of smaller initial differences at the time of migration. Moreover, because Muslim
migrants are more likely to suffer from discrimination, one would expect that they show lower levels of trust
in governments as a result. Yet, my findings point in the opposite direction. Although some convergence
with natives is taking place, they exhibit consistently higher levels of trust in political institutions than other
immigrants, at least 1 point higher on the 0-10 scale regardless of the number of years spent in their destination
country. On the other hand, non-Muslim immigrants assimilate completely after 35 years of residence. As
outlined previously, a plausible explanation is that Muslim immigrants judge the quality of government and
political institutions based on the previous experience of their home country, which are often ruled by undemo-
cratic regimes. A similar pattern is also visible when we turn to community size. Immigrants from smaller
communities strongly assimilate while the relative level of trust in national parliaments changes little among
immigrants living among numerous co-ethnics.
On immigration policies, Figure 3 reveals that the preferences of immigrants from developed countries are rela-
tively closer to those of natives upon arrival but never close the gap with them20. On the other hand, immigrants
from less developed countries are significantly more supportive of immigration at the time of migration but this
support decreases over time to the point where they hardly show any differences with natives after 35 years,
driving the general convergence in attitudes observed in Figure 2. A possible intuition behind these patterns
of convergence is the different nature of migration for individuals from developed and non-developed countries.
Indeed, immigrants from developed countries are less subject to re-emigration21, which could explain why their
opinion on border control and immigration policy remain more liberal than those of other foreign-born resi-
dents. Attitudes towards EU unification confirms the previous intuition. Although their views are significantly
closer to those of natives upon arrival, migrants from developed countries show no sign of assimilation while
support for EU unification decreases significantly among immigrants coming from non-developed countries.
20The fact that immigrants from developed countries are less supportive of open immigration policies than migrants from non-
developed countries upon arrival can be explained by the fact that many of them come from countries with a large share of foreigner
residents where immigration policy itself is a contentious issue.
21Bratsberg et al. (2007) show that the retention rate of immigrants from OECD countries is below 30% while that for immigrants
from non-Western countries is above 75%.
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On a more general level, the heterogeneity across different subgroups of immigrants provides valuable insight
on the drivers of political assimilation.
First, while my method does not allow to disentangle elements of preferences that reflect the current economic
and institutional environment and those that reflect culture, marked differences in opinion between subgroups
at the time of migration suggest that the opinion gap between immigrants and natives may have a large cultural
component. Earlier cohorts - between 1 and 5 years of residence - of immigrants from developed countries,
non-Muslim immigrants, and immigrants sharing a common language have preferences that are relatively closer
to those of natives, which highlight the role of cultural proximity. In fact, whether these differences reflect
individuals’ perception of the current context in their destination country rather than deep-seated beliefs does
not affect my conclusion that cultural background matters for political assimilation 22.
Moreover, the dynamic analysis provides empirical support to the economic models of cultural integration that
account for endogenous preferences. As suggested previously, the difference in convergence patterns between
immigrants from developed and non-developed countries can be explained by group-specific incentives to as-
similate. First, immigrants from developed countries have a lower intended duration of stay in their residence
country and a higher propensity among the former to re-emigrate, which reduce the relative value of integration.
Second, origin country characteristics make it more costly for migrants from non-developed countries to return
to their home state and more difficult to reverse the migration, which in turn enhance their assimilation process
(Jasso and Rosenzweig, 1986; Portes and Rumbaut, 1996).
I also find that immigrants that are part of a community that represents less than 1% of the destination coun-
try’s population start assimilating sooner than other immigrants. In particular, my findings indicate that the
general reduction in the opinion gap observed after 20 years spent in the destination country in section 3.1 is
driven almost exclusively by those immigrants belonging to smaller communities23. To a lesser extent, slower
convergence in political preferences is observed among immigrants whose country of origin shares a common
language with their destination country. Because language proficiency and access to larger social networks
increase immigrants’ chances in the host country, it is possible that this slower convergence reflects the lower
relative value of cultural and political assimilation for these immigrants24.
22It is possible that these differences are caused by greater self-selection of immigrants with cultural ties to Western Europe.
However, I discuss in the last section of the paper why the political preferences studied in this paper are unlikely to suffer from a
self-selection bias
23Because of the scarcity of historical data on immigrants’ birth country, the relative size of immigrant communities is measured
in 2010. My proxy of community size is therefore potentially problematic for immigrants who migrated a long time ago, when
the number of immigrants from the same country of origin was significantly different than in 2010. However, the birth country
composition of foreign-born populations in the sample is highly correlated overtime. Because my measure of community size
depends ultimately on the relative size of these populations, this reduces the risk of misallocation between small and big immigrant
communities. Finally, the main difference in assimilation across communities regards immigrants with shorter tenure - i.e less than
20 years since migration -, for which the 2010 Census data is a more accurate proxy of the actual composition of the foreign-born
population than for immigrants with longer tenure.
24The literature has found that language proficiency has a positive effect on employment probabilities of immigrants (see Dust-
mann et al. (2003), and that migrant networks can lead to better economic prospects when the corresponding community is
well-established (Colussi, 2015; Beaman, 2012)
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3.3 The role of host societies
The previous section suggests that immigrants’ institutional, cultural, and religious background as well as the
size of their community are important drivers of the preference gap with natives and potentially reflect the cost
and benefit structure of assimilation. In this section, I investigate a different aspect of the key mechanisms
driving assimilation. In light of the fact that the political assimilation of foreign-born immigrants is almost
exclusively driven by individuals from non-developed countries outside Europe, I ask the following question:
Does assimilation result from destination country effects and immigrants’ gradual adoption of country-specific
cultural norms and conventions, or do migrants adjust to a set of institutions and opportunity structures that
are not specific to their country of residence, but rather the product of Western Europe’s cultural, political and
economic heritage, such as a free-market economy, democratic institutions, multicultural societies, and general
distrust in modern-day democratic politics, both domestically and at the European level? To answer this ques-
tion, I look at the role played by destination country-specific culture and institutions through acculturation, i.e.
the tendency of immigrants to adapt over time to the political preferences of natives in their destination country.
Because of the limited number of countries in the study, using a regression such as (1) on the immigrant
sample and including measures of national mean political preferences and other institutional and economic
characteristics at the country level is problematic. If included one at a time, these measures will capture all
other unobserved country effects, and their own effect will not be identified. If, instead, they are included into
regressions together, the problem is their high collinearity and limited variation. To tackle this issue, I adopt the
two-stage methodology formalized by Card and Krueger (1992), and applied to studying culture transmission
by Blau (1992), Fernandez and Fogli (2009), and Aleksynska (2011). In the first stage, I estimate the following
regression for immigrants with destination country fixed effects:
Prefijtk = α+ γXi + δjtk + εijtk (3)
To make sure that I am able to isolate the effect of national political culture on immigrants’ preferences, the X
vector includes all individual controls from model (1), as well as several migrant-specific additional controls that
are likely to influence political opinions. In particular, I know from what precedes that cross-national differences
in immigrants’ attitudes could originate from composition effects, especially in terms of the origin and religion
of immigrants. I therefore include a categorical variable to control for the region of origin of immigrants25 as
well as a full set of dummy variable controlling for religious affiliation. I also control for whether migrants have
the citizenship of their country of residence, and whether they possess EU citizenship or not.
Coefficient δjtk captures destination country effects that are both time and cohort specific. These regressions
are estimated separately for each survey round t because of the country-specific changes that affected political
preferences between 2010 and 201826. Also, to check for acculturation and the differentiated effect of destination
25These groups are Africa, South Asia, East Asia, MENA, Western Europe and Anglo-Saxon countries, Southern Europe, and
South America and the Caribbean. A detailed list of immigrants by country of birth is available in Table 10
26Prominent examples of major international events that had country-specific political consequences include the 2008 economic
and financial crisis, the 2015 refugee crisis, or Brexit.
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country on immigrants with more or less residence time, I split the immigrants sample into 2 cohorts using the
median tenure among immigrants. The subindex k distinguishes between migrants that have lived less or more
than 15 years in the destination country. I also restrict the sample to country-year pairs for which I have at
least 25 observations in each sub-group of immigrants27.
In the second stage, the vectors of coefficients on destination country effects δ are regressed on destination
country variables in a pooled regression with all survey rounds, in order to explain ceteris paribus differences
in political preferences:
δjtk = β0 + β1kPref jt + β2Cjt + µt + εjtk (4)
where δ is the coefficient on the dummy variable for cohort k, destination country j in survey round t estimated
from equation (3), Pref jt are natives’ average political preferences in year t and Cjt are destination country
variables that include time-specific destination country per capita GDP and share of foreign-born population28.
Regressions are estimated by weighted least squares, with first-stage inverse sampling variances of the estimated
effects serving as weights29. Coefficient β1k then captures the cohort-specific marginal effect of natives’ mean
political preferences as predictor of immigrants political preferences in the destination country30.
Before discussing the results of model (3) and (4), I provide in Table 8 a preliminary estimation on the full
sample of immigrants - i.e where all immigrants are pooled into a unique time cohort -. Panel A provides
an example of coefficients on destination-country fixed effect δ from the first-stage regression in the 2012 ESS
round. Panel B summarizes second-stage results for the full sample of immigrants based on first-stage desti-
nation country coefficients pooled across survey rounds. For each political preference, the first specification
presents the results including only a measure of natives’ mean political preferences as explanatory variables
while the second specification presents the results when destination country per capita GDP and the share of
foreign-born population are added. In the absence of controls, the mean preference variable is positive and
highly significant for all political items, and the R2 values are sizable, indicating that variation in destina-
tion country mean political preferences explains an important proportion of the variation in the coefficients
that captures immigrants’ country-specific preferences. Moreover, regressions with controls show that among
destination country variables, natives’ mean political preferences remain extremely important in explaining
first-stage destination-country fixed effects.
In the next table (Table 9), I run the analysis corresponding to model 3 and 4 where I distinguish between
immigrants with respectively less and more than 15 years of residence in their destination country. I find that
27Immigrants from Finland (rounds 2010, 2014, 2016), Italy (2012), Norway (2016), and Portugal (2014, 2016) were therefore
excluded from the analysis because too few migrants were surveyed to permit meaningful analysis. Estimating baseline model (1)
with the resulting sample yields very similar results to the original one.
28Natives’ mean score in country j and round t on a given political issue is computed using the average across native respondents,
weighted by design weights.
29This allows to control for possible within country correlation of regression errors in the first-stage.
30My results are robust to using the mean tenure (20 years of residence) as a threshold and to the inclusion of country-year
survey rounds with less than 25 migrant observations.
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the explanatory power of natives’ mean political preferences increases significantly with tenure for three of the
five dependent variables. The coefficient is more than twice as large for attitudes to gay rights, and a sizable,
although less spectacular gap, exists for preferences on immigration policies (1.7 times larger) and trust in na-
tional parliaments (1.2 times larger). These differences suggest that an acculturation of immigrants’ preferences
to country-specific norms takes place on these issues. The acculturation of immigrants’ preferences on social
issues such as homosexuality and immigration is not surprising and reflects the diversity of opinions in Western
Europe, which are themselves the product of cultural and religious traditions and immigration history31. On
the other hand, acculturation of political trust may seem counter-intuitive at first since little variation exists
across Western Europe democracies in terms of political regimes. It is however consistent with the cultural
theories on political trust, which hypothesize that trust in political institutions originates outside the political
sphere in long-standing and deeply seated cultural beliefs about people ( see Inglehart, 1997; Putnam, 1993),
and the findings of Dinesen et al. (2010), who show that an intergenerational acculturation of trust takes place
among non-western foreign-born individuals upon migrating to Western Europe.
In contrast, Table 9 indicates that no acculturation takes place in the long-run for preferences over redis-
tribution and attitudes to EU unification. The explanatory power of natives’ mean political preferences on
immigrants’ support for redistribution increases slightly with tenure, but this increase is far from significant. In
line with the interpretation suggested in section 3.1, this result lends support to the idea of a flexible adjustment
of immigrants’ attitudes to redistribution, where foreigners gain access to welfare services and face the same
opportunity structures as native-born individuals after a few years of residence in their destination country.
Thus, I hypothesize that natives’ attitudes towards redistribution may predict cross-national differences in im-
migrants’ attitudes through self-selection rather than changes in cultural values in the long run. Moreover, the
strong assimilation of preferences towards EU unification observed in Section 3.1 does not seem to be driven
by country-specific attitudes. The coefficient associated with natives’ mean preferences is slightly lower for
immigrants with longer tenure and the difference between both cohorts is nowhere near statistical significance.
Two distinct channels can potentially explain this result. First, it is likely that the perception of EU institu-
tions as whole influences immigrants’ political attitudes about greater unification. In this context, international
political institutions are often regarded as responsible for individual economic outcomes, and assimilation could
then simply reflect the general distrust in traditional political institutions that has accompanied the rise of
populism and anti-EU rhetoric in Western Europe over the past 20 years. A second possibility is that over
time, migrants develop an attachment to their country of residence which, in turn, favors nationalistic feelings
and more hostile views towards the EU, regardless of their destination country.
This section documents the long-term acculturation of immigrants’ political preferences about gay rights, im-
migration, and political trust to country-specific norms and conventions. Yet, in the current framework, I shall
stress that it is not possible to claim with certainty that this acculturation is driven by an actual shift in cul-
tural beliefs. Indeed, while cross-country differences suggest that political preferences may have an important
cultural component, they are also determined by contextual and institutional determinants. For instance, I
would expect differences in political preferences to be influenced by economic, political, or social aspects of the
31For instance, while all European countries have received an increasing number of immigrants in the past decade, Scandinavian
and Northern European countries are historically regarded as immigration countries, whereas Southern European states such as
Portugal, Italy, and Spain are mostly considered as emigration countries.
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environment and reflected in the national policies associated with each of these preferences. If this is the case,
I cannot rule out the possibility that migrants slowly update information about the current context in their
destination country, and that my estimates are simply picking up this slow updating rather than the true effect
of cultural changes. Unfortunately, testing the role played by each of these mechanism is not possible with the
ESS data. It therefore remains an important question but one that lies outside the scope of this paper.
3.4 Robustness to self-selection bias
A primary concern when examining the preferences of immigrants is selection. Cross-country migration deci-
sions are clearly non-random, and my primary issue here regards out-migration and the possibility that migrants
with preferences closer to natives stay longer in their country of residence, which would bias my results. In fact,
in a recent report, the OECD (2008) estimates that, depending on the countries and time periods considered,
20 to 50 percent of immigrants leave their host country within the first five years after arrival. In 2011, for
some of the countries under consideration in this study, foreign-born outflows stood respectively at a ratio of 41
percent, 64 percent, and 76 percent for the United Kingdom, Germany, and Spain. In the case of Europe, close
to 50 percent of the original arrival cohort has left the destination country ten years after arrival. If temporary
migrants are negatively self-selected with respect to their opinion gap with natives, the tenure effect that I
identify in the general analysis would reflect this self-selection mechanism rather than political assimilation.
Ideally, I would have longitudinal data to control for these cohort effects. In the absence of such data, I turn
to the existing literature on temporary migration. This literature identifies several individual characteristics of
return migrants in Europe which indicate that we should not be too concerned with the possibility that the
previous results are driven by self-selection of less integrated foreign-born individuals into return migration.
First, immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe are less likely to depart. For instance, in Norway,
although the average re-emigration rate after five years is about 50%, the retention rate of immigrants from
OECD countries is below 30% while that of immigrants from non-Western countries is above 75% (Bratsberg
et al., 2007). Likewise, in Sweden, the probability that an immigrant will leave the country is lower amongst
immigrants from Africa, Asia and Eastern Europe (Nekby, 2006). Against this backdrop, my analysis shows
that convergence in political attitudes is primarily driven by immigrants from non-developed countries, which
are therefore the least subject to return migration. If self-selection was indeed driving the results, I would
estimate a comparatively stronger assimilation effect among Western-born immigrants, who are relatively more
likely to re-emigrate than migrants from less developed countries. Second, the return rate in OECD coun-
tries after five years is not much higher than the return rate after three years among working-age immigrants,
suggesting that immigrants who leave their country of destination do so relatively shortly after arrival. This
result is largely explained by the fact that, in many European countries, an immigrant can obtain a long-term
residence permit after five years of residence, or even take out the nationality of the host country. More gen-
erally, the longer a migrant stays in the host country, the less likely he or she is to return home or emigrate
to a third country (OECD, 2008; Nekby, 2006). In contrast, my findings indicate that the convergence of
immigrants and natives’ political preferences goes on for several decades after the time of migration and is
therefore not particularly prone to selection effects that may occur during the first years of residence in the
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host country32. Finally, the re-emigration rate of highly skilled immigrants is above the average (OECD, 2008),
and immigrants with higher earnings have shorter intended stay: Data from the US New Immigrant Survey
(NIS) and the German Socio-economic Panel (SOEP) have shown that working-age immigrants with higher
level of education were significantly less likely to report an intention to stay permanently than their less edu-
cated counterparts, suggesting that immigrants’ plans to return differ along the distribution of pre-migration
education (see Dustmann, 2003). I ran separate analyses for low and high educated migrants, and found
that while high-educated migrants converge more rapidly to natives’ views on matters of homosexuality, trust,
and immigration, assimilation remains strong and statistically significant among low-skill migrants, indicating
that my general effect is not primarily driven by the self-selection of more skilled migrants into return migration.
4 Conclusion and discussion
As the proportion of immigrants is growing in developed countries, they increasingly influence the scope, shape,
and directions of the political life of receiving communities. This paper documents the political assimilation of
immigrants and therefore contributes to the understanding of the potential political and electoral consequences
of these demographic changes. It presents a descriptive analysis of first-generation immigrants’ political prefer-
ences on redistribution, homosexuality, immigration, political trust and attitudes to EU unification, and builds
on assimilation theory and economic models of cultural transmission to inform the interpretation of the results.
For all political outcomes with the exception of redistribution, I find that immigrants hold on average much
different views from natives, and that migration status has a greater effect on these preferences than any other
individual traits I am able to control for. In particular, foreign-born immigrants hold more restrictive views
on gay rights but show greater levels of trust in national parliaments and are more supportive of EU unifica-
tion and open immigration policies. Moreover, I find strong empirical support in favour of assimilation: The
preference gap between immigrants and natives gradually closes over time as immigrants’ preferences converge
to the norm, and the residual difference in preferences for immigrants with the longest tenure is negligible. In
contrast, at the time of migration, immigrants are only slightly more conservative than European natives, and
these differences disappear after only a few years in the destination country. My findings also suggest that
differences in migrants’ religious, linguistic and economic background play an important role in shaping both
the size of the preference gap with natives and the speed of assimilation. Political assimilation is almost exclu-
sively driven by immigrants from non-developed countries, and religious beliefs play an important part in this
assimilation process. Muslim immigrants hold political opinions that are consistently more distant from those
of natives than non-religious immigrants or immigrants who belong to another religious denomination, and
remain much more conservative than natives on the issue of gay rights over time. I also find that immigrants
with greater language proficiency or access to larger social networks are less likely to assimilate, suggesting that
immigrants may form endogenous preferences about the relative value of cultural and political assimilation, in
32This, in turn, would be problematic if most of the assimilation took place between the first and second cohorts of our sample,
i.e between immigrants with less than 5 years of residence and those with 6 to 10 years of residence. One exception is redistributive
preferences, for which I cannot exclude that the interpretation of the results may suffer from this bias.
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line with the economic literature on cultural transmission. Finally, I show that assimilation of preferences on
gay rights, immigration policy and trust in national parliaments is driven by acculturation to country-specific
norms, while the convergence patterns of attitudes to EU unification in the long run cannot be explained by
national specificities.
Throughout the analysis, the nature of political preferences appears to have a significant impact on the way
immigrants assimilate beside individual characteristics and host countries’ environment. On the one hand, they
reflect the economic and social integration of immigrants and their access to the same opportunities as natives.
At the same time, they also have large cultural underpinnings, which traditionally take longer to evolve. In the
current setting, I cannot however disentangle the role played by each of these channels. More research in this
direction is necessary.
From a policy perspective, my study informs the design of naturalization and citizenship policies, which are,
with very few exceptions, the only way to become eligible to vote in national elections in Western Europe.
By providing a detailed account of the chronological changes in political preferences between natives and first-
generation immigrants, this paper helps policy makers in receiving countries to estimate how the conditions
and timing of access to naturalization and citizenship can affect the consequences of foreign-born residents on
electoral and political outcomes33.
Last, this paper and the extant literature have documented the influence of European political norms on the
preferences of first-generation immigrants from outside Europe. One may ask symmetrically whether immigrants
who bring with them the culture of their origin country are in a position to influence natives at destination.
Tabellini and Giuliano (2020) go some way towards answering this question and find that immigration left
its footprint on American ideology via cultural transmission from at the time of the New Deal. This paper
neither intends to, nor can provide an answer to this question in the European context. However, whether
such influence and transformation of existing societies are indeed taking place is an important issue for further
research.
33In practice, second-generation immigrants born in Western Europe are de facto eligible to naturalization before they reach
the age of voting, both in jus soli countries and those with a mixed citizenship regime. The consequences of immigrants’ political
integration are therefore directly and substantially impacted by citizenship policies through the size and composition of the foreign-
born population that they add to the franchise.
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Table 1: Sample statistics, Destination countries
Destination country Total number Native-born Foreign-born as Percent of foreign- Number of
of obs. % of sample % of sample born with over ESS rounds
20 yrs. of residence
Austria 7,734 89.67 10.33 55.07 4
Belgium 8,223 86.87 13.13 42.04 5
Denmark 4,486 93.89 6.11 53.65 3
Finland 9,441 97.22 2.78 22.52 5
France 8,785 90.27 9.73 64.56 5
Germany 13,243 90.11 9.89 53.66 5
Greece 2,429 91.68 8.32 24.75 1
Ireland 11,346 87.75 12.25 19.06 5
Italy 5,291 94.37 5.63 30.54 3
Netherlands 8,364 91.98 8.02 60.51 5
Norway 6,895 93.62 6.38 37.27 5
Portugal 6,212 95.64 4.36 33.58 4
Spain 6,929 91.15 8.85 15.17 4
Sweden 6,237 88.26 11.74 60.11 4
Switzerland 6,782 74.3 25.7 52.21 5
United Kingdom 9,940 90.96 9.04 39.82 5
Average 7,646 90.49 9.52 41.5
Table 2: Dependent variables
Redistribution Gay rights Political trust EU attitudes Immigration
Scale Natives Foreign-born Scale Natives Foreign-born Scale Natives Foreign-born Scale Natives Foreign-born Scale Natives Foreign-born
0 2.42 % 2.76 % 0 2.24 % 6.66 % 0 8.96 % 5.64 % 0 7.25 % 6.17 % 0 6.72 % 2.74 %
1 11.15 % 11.62 % 1 4.14 % 7.77 % 1 4.18 % 2.83 % 1 4.27 % 3.36 % 1 22.32 % 16.03 %
2 14.79 % 15.76 % 2 8.66 % 12 % 2 7.4 % 5.47 % 2 7.62 % 6.51 % 2 49.27 % 52.88 %
3 44.13 % 44.7 % 3 38.18 % 36.47 % 3 10.44 % 8.33 % 3 10.26 % 7.88 % 3 21.68 % 28.35 %
4 27.51 % 25.16 % 4 46.78 % 37.6 % 4 10.64 % 8.47 % 4 9.89 % 7.56 %
5 17.79 % 19.66 % 5 23.33 % 23 %
6 13.04 % 12.55 % 6 10.21 % 10.2 %
7 13.69 % 15.44 % 7 10.52 % 11.69 %
8 9.52 % 12.77 % 8 9.03 % 11.62 %
9 2.78 % 4.64 % 9 3.01 % 4.53 %
10 1.55 % 4.2 % 10 4.62 % 7.47 %
Notes: Cross-tabulations account for survey design and population weights. The categories for all dependent variables have been reordered to run from conservative to
liberal or negative to positive attitudes.
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More than 45 1,390








Western Europe and Anglo-Sax. 3,644
Total 11,839
Table 4: Political preferences - Natives and first-generation immigrants
Redistribution Homosexuality EU attitudes Immigration Trust
(0-4) (0-4) (0-10) (0-3) (0-10)
Natives 2.86 3.26 5.09 1.90 4.41
Foreign-born 2.82 2.83 5.53 2.08 5.21
Of which
- Less than 20 years of residency 2.80 2.78 5.86 2.14 5.41
- More than 20 years of residency 2.86 2.88 5.12 2.00 4.96
Source: Own calculations based on the ESS using survey design and population weights. For all dependent
variables, the table presents the weighted average. T-tests show that differences in mean values are significant at
1% between foreign-born and natives, and between foreign-born individuals with less than 20 years and more than
20 years of residency.
27
Table 5: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Individual characteristics (Full sample)
Foreign-born 0.1 0.3 0 1 122337
Age 50.02 18.45 16 100 122337
Male 0.48 0.5 0 1 122337
Married 0.48 0.5 0 1 122337
Years of education completed 12.93 4.29 0 54 122337
Lives in rural area 0.39 0.49 0 1 122337
Log household size 0.8 0.53 0 2.94 122337
In the labour force and employed 0.53 0.5 0 1 122337
Concerns about hh income 1.84 0.82 1 4 122337
Religiosity (0-10) scale 4.47 3.02 0 10 122337
Member of ethnic minority 0.04 0.19 0 1 122337
Income level (decile rank) 5.32 2.78 1 10 102413
Ever unemployed and seeking work for over 3 months 0.28 0.45 0 1 122337
Partner doing last 7 days: paid work 0.35 0.48 0 1 122337
EU citizen 0.97 0.17 0 1 122337
Citizen of host country 0.95 0.22 0 1 122322
Main source of income:
- Wage and salaries 0.57 0.5 0 1 122337
- Self-employed 0.07 0.26 0 1 122337
- Pensions 0.27 0.44 0 1 122337
- Unemployment benefits 0.03 0.17 0 1 122337
- Social benefits 0.04 0.19 0 1 122337
- Investments 0.01 0.08 0 1 122337
- Other sources of inc. 0.01 0.12 0 1 122337
Political attitudes:
Redistribution 2.83 1.03 0 4 120908
Gay rights 3.2 0.96 0 4 120716
Trust in national parliament 4.79 2.53 0 10 120109
EU unification 4.92 2.59 0 10 89709
Support for immig. 1.88 0.82 0 3 120033
Individual characteristics (Immig. sample)
Years of residence in host country 21.73 16.93 1 89 11839
Developed origin country 0.3 0.46 0 1 11839
Muslim 0.16 0.37 0 1 11778
Common official language 0.31 0.46 0 1 11746
Community size (% of birth country group in tot pop.) 0.32 0.47 0 1 11839
Country characteristics
Log of gdp 10.47 0.38 9.71 11.16 16
Unemployment (%) 9.18 4.77 3.85 23.08 16
Share of foreign-born (%) 8.91 4.67 3.58 23.32 16
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Table 6: Opinion Gap between First-Generation Immigrants and Natives
Redistribution Homosexuality EU attitudes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
First-generation immig. -0.004 -0.047∗∗∗ -0.120∗∗∗ -0.470∗∗∗ -0.365∗∗∗ -0.558∗∗∗ 0.481∗∗∗ 0.381∗∗∗ 0.775∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.018) (0.027) (0.019) (0.018) (0.030) (0.048) (0.054) (0.085)
Yrs. in host country 0.003∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
Individual controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
N 102073 102073 102073 101957 101957 101957 78194 78194 78194
r2 0.046 0.091 0.092 0.059 0.166 0.168 0.063 0.103 0.104
Immigration Trust
(10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
First-gen. immig. 0.119∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.236∗∗∗ 0.688∗∗∗ 0.641∗∗∗ 1.155∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.013) (0.020) (0.039) (0.044) (0.069)
Yrs. in host country -0.004∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.002)
Individual controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
N 101329 101329 101329 101487 101487 101487
r2 0.087 0.160 0.161 0.095 0.161 0.163
Individual controls include age, gender, marital status, years of education, whether the respondent lives in a rural or urban area,
household size, employment status of the respondent and the respondent’s partner, household’s income level (decile rank), primary
income source, past unemployment experience, respondent’s feelings about household’s income, religiosity, whether the respondent
is a self-declared member of an ethnic minority. All regressions include dummies for country of residence and ESS survey round
and account for survey design and population weights. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01.
Table 7: Opinion Gap and Immigrants’ Background
Coefficient on dummy variable for being born outside of the country of residence
Redistribution Homosexuality EU attitudes Immigration Trust Immig. obs.
Origin: Non-developed -0.0423∗∗ -0.486∗∗∗ 0.428∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗ 0.755∗∗∗ 8,318
(0.0184) (0.0201) (0.0574) (0.0136) (0.0469)
Origin: Developed 0.0334 0.0175 0.360∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗ 0.215∗∗∗ 3,521
(0.0289) (0.0249) (0.0885) (0.0193) (0.0683)
Non-muslim -0.0313∗ -0.291∗∗∗ 0.386∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗ 0.564∗∗∗ 9,900
(0.0168) (0.0174) (0.0531) (0.0122) (0.0421)
Muslim 0.0153 -0.893∗∗∗ 0.656∗∗∗ 0.200∗∗∗ 1.193∗∗∗ 1,878
(0.0381) (0.0455) (0.111) (0.0282) (0.102)
No common language -0.0495∗∗∗ -0.410∗∗∗ 0.423∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗ 0.661∗∗∗ 8,150
(0.0190) (0.0205) (0.0624) (0.0141) (0.0490)
Common language 0.00628 -0.304∗∗∗ 0.269∗∗∗ 0.181∗∗∗ 0.584∗∗∗ 3,596
(0.0286) (0.0306) (0.0779) (0.0197) (0.0686)
Small community (< 1% of pop.) -0.0209 -0.364∗∗∗ 0.481∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗ 0.580∗∗∗ 8,084
(0.0182) (0.0193) (0.0576) (0.0133) (0.0464)
Large community ( (> 1% of pop.) -0.0289 -0.410∗∗∗ 0.226∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗ 0.850∗∗∗ 3,755
(0.0281) (0.0312) (0.0826) (0.0206) (0.0690)
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Each cell represents a separate regression, in which column heading denotes the independent variable, and row heading
denotes the sub-sample of migrants included in the regression with the native-born sample. The last column indicates
the number of migrants in each sub-group. All regressions include dummies for country of residence and ESS survey round
and account for survey design and population weights. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 8: The Role of Destination Countries
Panel A: Example of a first stage regression (2012 survey round, full sample)
Redistribution Homosexuality Trust EU attitudes Immigration
Belgium 0.131 -0.459∗∗∗ 0.173 0.513 0.152
(0.167) (0.171) (0.325) (0.384) (0.114)
Denmark -0.324∗ -0.390∗∗ 1.308∗∗∗ 1.409∗∗∗ 0.270∗∗
(0.189) (0.175) (0.409) (0.461) (0.125)
Finland 0.025 -0.859∗∗∗ 0.042 -0.656 0.092
(0.279) (0.301) (0.509) (0.534) (0.173)
France 0.385∗∗ -0.586∗∗∗ -0.962∗∗∗ -0.031 0.190∗
(0.181) (0.168) (0.357) (0.384) (0.115)
Germany 0.436∗∗∗ -0.665∗∗∗ 0.040 0.506 0.509∗∗∗
(0.151) (0.149) (0.313) (0.378) (0.108)
Ireland 0.399∗∗ -0.109 -1.679∗∗∗ -0.500 -0.072
(0.198) (0.159) (0.389) (0.450) (0.146)
Norway -0.138 -0.410∗∗ 0.870∗∗ -0.091 0.452∗∗∗
(0.188) (0.174) (0.368) (0.405) (0.128)
Portugal 0.357∗ -0.349 -1.366∗∗∗ 1.107 0.315
(0.184) (0.243) (0.526) (0.789) (0.226)
Spain 0.501∗∗ -0.303 -1.538∗∗∗ 1.469∗∗∗ 0.315∗∗
(0.199) (0.189) (0.474) (0.480) (0.158)
Sweden 0.600∗∗∗ -0.556∗∗∗ 0.611∗ 0.209 0.519∗∗∗
(0.154) (0.145) (0.320) (0.376) (0.107)
Switzerland 0.361∗∗ -0.633∗∗∗ 1.526∗∗∗ 0.117 0.286∗∗∗
(0.152) (0.150) (0.293) (0.356) (0.105)
United Kingdom 0.254 -0.438∗∗∗ -0.987∗∗∗ -1.136∗∗∗ -0.037
(0.173) (0.158) (0.356) (0.391) (0.120)
Obs. 2301 2307 2176 2193 2288
r2 0.108 0.226 0.206 0.088 0.124
Regressions account for survey design weights and include the full set of controls from model 1 as well as region of origin,
religious affiliation, citizenship of residence country and EU citizenship. Omitted residence country for this and all other
first-stage regressions: Netherlands. Austria and Greece were not surveyed by the ESS in 2012. Italy is excluded from the
analysis in 2012 because too few migrants were surveyed to permit meaningful analysis.
Panel B: Second stage regression (full-sample)
Redistribution Homosexuality EU attitudes Immigration Trust
Natives’ mean pref. 0.734∗∗∗ 0.655∗∗∗ 0.491∗∗∗ 0.553∗∗∗ 0.682∗∗∗ 0.613∗∗∗ 0.286∗∗∗ 0.328∗∗∗ 0.792∗∗∗ 0.754∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.069) (0.103) (0.112) (0.112) (0.112) (0.063) (0.068) (0.041) (0.049)
log GDP -0.269∗∗ -0.182 -0.841∗ -0.116 -0.073
(0.110) (0.139) (0.438) (0.108) (0.293)
Share of foreigners 0.009∗∗ 0.007 0.003 -0.003 0.027∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.006) (0.017) (0.004) (0.010)
Obs. 56 56 56 56 56 56 43 43 56 56
r2 0.783 0.812 0.455 0.477 0.516 0.576 0.356 0.408 0.895 0.912
All regressions include year dummy variables. Dependent variable: Corresponding destination country fixed effect from the
first-stage. Estimation method: weighted least squares; with first-stage inverse sampling variances of the estimated fixed effects
as weights. Missing country-year pairs: Finland (2010, 2014, 2016), Italy (2012), Norway (2016), Portugal (2014, 2016) ∗ p < .10,
∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01.
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Table 9: Acculturation to Destination Country’s Political Preferences
Redistribution Homosexuality EU attitudes Immigration Trust
Tenure Less than More than Less than More than Less than More than Less than More than Less than More than
15 yrs 15 yrs 15 yrs 15 yrs 15 yrs 15 yrs 15 yrs 15 yrs 15 yrs 15 yrs
Natives’ mean pref. 0.594∗∗∗ 0.648∗∗∗ 0.346∗∗ 0.747∗∗∗a 0.672∗∗∗ 0.604∗∗∗ 0.243∗∗∗ 0.420∗∗∗b 0.697∗∗∗ 0.842∗∗∗b
(0.130) (0.104) (0.150) (0.124) (0.136) (0.119) (0.088) (0.070) (0.099) (0.082)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 56 56 56 56 56 56 43 43 56 56
r2 0.581 0.581 0.383 0.383 0.593 0.593 0.424 0.424 0.842 0.842
All regressions include year dummy variables and control for log of GDP and foreign population. Dependent variable: Cohort-specific destination country
fixed effect from first-stage. Estimation method: weighted least squares; with first-stage inverse sampling variances of the estimated fixed effects as
weights. For each dependent variable, coefficients for both cohort are estimated in a single regression. a: T-test for difference in coefficients between
cohorts is significant at the 5% level. b: T-test for difference in coefficients between cohorts is significant at the 10% level. Missing country-year pairs:
Finland (2010, 2014, 2016), Italy (2012), Norway (2016), Portugal (2014, 2016) ∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 10: Immigrants - Country of origin
Country of origin Obs. Country of origin Obs. Country of origin Obs.
AE 1 GN 22 NO 52
AF 72 GP 2 NP 19
AG 1 GQ 7 NZ 14
AL 214 GR 61 PA 2
AM 30 GT 4 PE 77
AN 4 GW 12 PF 1
AO 71 GY 7 PG 1
AR 73 HK 9 PH 94
AS 1 HN 7 PK 178
AT 125 HR 141 PL 899
AU 30 HT 6 PR 2
AW 10 HU 118 PS 7
AX 2 ID 73 PT 303
AZ 5 IE 105 PY 13
BA 279 IL 14 RE 6
BD 33 IM 1 RO 471
BE 74 IN 307 RS 160
BF 6 IO 1 RU 224
BG 100 IQ 144 RW 21
BI 9 IR 141 SA 9
BJ 6 IS 21 SC 1
BN 3 IT 411 SD 13
BO 37 JE 1 SE 97
BQ 4 JM 38 SG 5
BR 222 JO 6 SI 34
BW 1 JP 31 SK 56
BY 19 KE 39 SL 8
CA 26 KG 21 SN 47
CD 51 KH 8 SO 78
CF 5 KM 5 SR 80
CG 41 KP 4 ST 8
CH 43 KR 17 SV 6
CI 34 KW 6 SX 1
CL 58 KZ 125 SY 93
CM 31 LA 5 RS 16
CN 92 LB 53 TD 4
CO 81 LC 3 TG 14
CR 2 LI 2 TH 68
CU 28 LK 65 TJ 7
CV 63 LR 2 TL 2
CW 25 LS 1 TM 2
CY 4 LT 98 TN 99
CZ (Rep.) 94 LU 8 TR 473
CZ 24 LV 62 TT 4
DE 777 LY 4 TW 3
DJ 3 MA 468 TZ 12
DK 71 MD 34 TL 2
DM 3 ME 7 UA 87
DO 39 MG 20 UG 10
DZ 198 MK 95 US 144
EC 77 ML 8 USSR 241
EE 81 MM 1 UY 14
EG 45 MN 3 UZ 13
ER 28 MO 2 VE 42
ES 51 MQ 4 VN 63
ET 23 MR 4 XK 141
FI 128 MT 3 YE 1
FO 8 MU 17 YT 2
FR 342 MW 2 YG 75
GA 7 MX 32 ZA 68
GB 562 MY 22 ZM 4
GD 3 MZ 23 ZW 34
GE 21 NE 4
GF 1 NG 105
GH 38 NI 4
GL 4 NL 204
GM 11 NO 52
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Figures
Figure 1: Tenure in destination country (First-generation immigrants)
Figure 2: Convergence in political attitudes: Full sample
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Figure 3: Convergence in attitudes: Developed vs non-developed
Figure 4: Convergence in attitudes: Religion
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Figure 5: Convergence in attitudes: Common language
Figure 6: Convergence in political attitudes: Community size
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